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Abstract. We examine the problem of rendezvous, i.e., having multiple mobile
agents gather in a single node of the network. Unlike previous studies, we need to
achieve rendezvous in presence of a very powerful adversary, a malicious agent
that moves through the network and tries to block the honest agents and prevents
them from gathering. The malicious agent can be thought of as a mobile fault
in the network. The malicious agent is assumed to be arbitrarily fast, has full
knowledge of the network and it cannot be exterminated by the honest agents.
On the other hand, the honest agents are assumed to be quite weak: They are
asynchronous and anonymous, they have only finite memory, they have no prior
knowledge of the network and they can communicate with the other agents only
when they meet at a node. Can the honest agents achieve rendezvous starting from
an arbitrary configuration in spite of the malicious agent? We present some neces-
sary conditions for solving rendezvous in spite of the malicious agent in arbitrary
networks. We then focus on the ring and mesh topologies and provide algorithms
to solve rendezvous. For ring networks, our algorithms solve rendezvous in all
feasible instances of the problem, while we show that rendezvous is impossible
for an even number of agents in unoriented rings. For the oriented mesh networks,
we prove that the problem can be solved when the honest agents initially form a
connected configuration without holes if and only if they can see which are the
occupied nodes within a two-hops distance. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first attempt to study such a powerful and mobile fault model, in the con-
text of mobile agents. Our model lies between the more powerful but static fault
model of black holes (which can even destroy the agents), and the less powerful
but mobile fault model of Byzantine agents (which can only imitate the honest
agents but can neither harm nor stop them).
Keywords: Asynchronous; mobile agents; rendezvous problem; malicious agent.
1 Introduction
One of the fundamental problems in distributed computing with mobile robots or agents
is the problem of gathering all agents at a single location, known as the rendezvous
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the PRIN 2010 Project Security Horizons, and by
the ANR - MACARON project (anr-13-js02-0002).
problem. Rendezvous is important for example, for coordination between the agents
or for sharing information or for planning a collaborative task. This problem has been
well studied for the fault-free environment but there are very few results on solving
rendezvous in the presence of faults, in particular, in the presence of a hostile entity
that could prevent the agents from achieving their task. As in most previous works, we
model the environment as a connected graph with multiple mobile agents moving along
the edges of the graph; the objective is to gather them at a single node of the graph.
In this context, the hostile entity may be either stationary (e.g. a harmful node in the
graph) or mobile (e.g. a virus propagating on a network). Methods for protecting mobile
agents from malicious host nodes have been proposed, e.g. based on the identification
of the malicious host [14]. However, the issue of protecting a network (hosts and mobile
agents) from a malicious and mobile entity is still wide open (see [18] and references
therein).
A model for a particularly harmful node which has been extensively studied is the
black hole, where a node which contains a stationary process destroys all mobile agents
upon visiting it, without leaving any trace. In this case, although the hostile entity is
very powerful, it is stationary; the mobile agents can simply avoid the black hole once
its location is known. Thus, the main issue is locating the black hole [14,17,19]. Locat-
ing and avoiding a malicious entity that is also mobile and moves from node to node of
the graph, seems to be a more difficult problem. A recent result considers the problem
of rendezvous in the presence of Byzantine agents [12]. A Byzantine agent is indistin-
guishable from the legitimate or honest agents, except that it may behave in an arbitrary
manner and may provide false information to the honest agents in order to induce them
to make mistakes, thus preventing the rendezvous of the honest agents. Thus, the issue
here is identifying the Byzantine agents and distinguishing them from the honest agents.
Note that the Byzantine agent cannot actively harm the agent or physically prevent the
agents from gathering. In this paper, we consider a more powerful adversary called a
malicious agent which can actively block the movement of an honest agent to the node
occupied by the malicious agent. For example, when two honest agents are close to
each other, the malicious agent can enter the path between the two agents and prevent
them from meeting. We investigate the feasibility of rendezvous in the presence of such
a powerful adversary. In particular, the malicious agent is more powerful than the hon-
est agents; it can move arbitrarily fast through the graph, has full information about the
current configuration (i.e. the graph and location of the agents), and has knowledge of
the next action to be taken by each honest agent. On the other hand, the honest agents
are relatively weak; they are anonymous finite automata, they move asynchronously
without any prior knowledge of the graph and they can communicate only locally on
meeting another agent at the same node. We remark here that the malicious agent is dis-
tinguishable from the honest agents, so the question of identifying the malicious agent
(as in Dieudonne et al. [12]), does not arise here.
We believe this is an interesting model for studying mobile faults in a graph, that
has never been considered before. In some sense this model can be seen as an extension
of the model of networks with delay faults. For example, Chalopin et al. [8] consider
the problem of rendezvous in the presence of an adversary that can prevent an agent
from moving for an arbitrary but finite time. In their case, the agent cannot be blocked
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forever as in our scenario. Our model can also be contrasted with the model for network
decontamination or, cops and robbers search games on graphs, where a team of good
agents (called cops) tries to capture a fast fugitive (robber). The fugitive or hostile entity
is exterminated as soon as one of the cops reaches it. Thus the behavior of the hostile
entity, in this case, is opposite to that of the malicious agent in our model – instead of
blocking the honest agents, the hostile entity tries to get away from the good agents.
In terms of practical motivation for this research, we can think of the malicious
agent as representing a virus that may spread around the network. While in the classi-
cal decontamination problem the aim is to extinguish the virus, in our setting the virus
cannot be extinguished and has to be contained in one part of the network, thus dividing
the network into unstrusted and trusted subnetworks. This scenario can be compared to
the problem of botnets, i.e. a subnet of compromised computers (bots), typically used
for denial-of-service attacks on the internet. The untrusted subnetwork in our model
can be seen as a botnet, and the botmaster who controls the bots represents the mali-
cious agent. An honest agent that resides on a node protects the trusted network from
the untrusted one by running some protection mechanism (e.g. a firewall, an intrusion
detection mechanism, etc.). Thus the malicious agent cannot enter a node already occu-
pied by an honest agent. On the other hand the botnet is dynamic, and it may reduce its
dimension (i.e., when the botmaster leaves the host) or it may increase it only on hosts
not occupied, i.e., not protected by an agent. Honest agents may expand towards the
untrusted hosts which are not controlled by the botmaster anymore by running botnet
detection mechanisms (see, e.g., [25]). We are then interested in solving the rendezvous
problem in the trusted subnetwork, and we want to study how this malicious behaviour
affects the solvability of the Rendezvous problem.
Related Work: The rendezvous problem has been studied for agents moving on
graphs [2] or for robots moving on the plane [9], using either deterministic or ran-
domized algorithms. In the fault-free scenario, the rendezvous problem can be solved
relatively easily, even in asynchronous networks, when the network has an asymmetry
(e.g., a distinguished node), and can be explored by the agents, since the mobile agents
can simply be instructed to meet at such a distinguished node. However, this is not the
case for symmetric networks, or when the agents is incapable of visiting all nodes of
the network, and the rendezvous problem in such settings is non-trivial and not always
solvable even in simple topologies such as the ring network [21]. Symmetry-breaking
for the rendezvous problem can be achieved by attaching unique identifiers to the agents
(see, e.g., [10,24]), or in the anonymous case using tokens as in e.g., [6,11]. With re-
spect to hostile environments, the Rendezvous problem has been studied when there is a
black hole or other stationary faults in the network [7,13,23]. Another model for hostile
nodes has been presented in [3,20], where the authors have studied how a more severe
(than a black hole) behaviour of a malicious host affects the solvability of the Periodic
Data Retrieval problem in asynchronous networks. A well studied problem in the con-
text of a mobile adversary is the problem of graph searching where a team of mobile
agents has to decontaminate the infected sites and prevent any reinfection of cleaned
areas. This problem is equivalent to the one of capturing a fast and invisible fugitive
moving in the network. For results on this and related problems see, e.g., [4,15,16,22].
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Gathering of mobile agents has been also studied in the plane when there are faulty
agents which may crash [1,5] and in networks with delay faults [8] or in the presence
of Byzantine agents [12], as mentioned before. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the rendezvous problem has never been studied under the presence of hostile agents that
may block other agents from having access to parts of the network.
Our Results: In this paper we consider a network modelled as a connected undirected
graph with multiple honest agents located at distinct nodes of the graph. There is also
a hostile entity which is mobile, called the malicious agent. It cannot harm the honest
agents but can prevent them from visiting a node: an honest mobile agent cannot visit a
node which is occupied by a malicious agent and vice versa. We are interested in solving
the rendezvous of all honest agents in this hostile environment. Our objective is to study
the feasibility of rendezvous with minimal assumptions. Thus, we consider the weakest
possible model for the honest agents. The honest agents are finite state automata with
local communication capability and having no prior knowledge of the network. In Sec-
tion 2 we show some configurations in which the problem is unsolvable and we discuss
properties that must be respected by any correct algorithm for the problem. For the rest
of the paper, we consider ring and mesh networks – two topologies that can be explored
even by a finite automaton. In Section 3 we present a rendezvous algorithm for ring
networks. For oriented rings, we have a universal algorithm that achieves rendezvous
starting from any initial configuration, despite the existence of a malicious agent. We
prove that the problem is unsolvable for any even number of agents in unoriented rings.
Finally, we present an algorithm for rendezvous of any odd number of agents in unori-
ented rings, thus solving the problem in all solvable instances. In Section 4 we consider
oriented mesh topologies and we prove that the problem can be solved when the agents
initially form a connected configuration without holes if and only if they can detect
which are the occupied nodes within a distance of two hops. We show that this latter
capability is necessary to achieve rendezvous even for connected configurations with-
out holes. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion about future research directions
for this new model.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Our Model
We represent the network by a graph G = (V,E) composed by |V | = n anonymous
nodes or hosts and |E| edges or connections between nodes. Each host is connected
to other hosts by bidirectional asynchronous FIFO links (i.e., an agent cannot overtake
another agent moving in the same edge), and it is capable of serving agents by a mu-
tual exclusive mechanism (i.e., an agent at a node u must finish its computation and
move or decide to stay, before any other agent at u starts its computation or another
agent visits u). The links incident to a host are distinctly labelled but this port labelling
(unless explicitly mentioned), is not globally consistent. In the network there are some
mobile agents which are independent computational processes with some constant in-
ternal memory. The agents are initially scattered in the network (i.e., at most one agent
at a node), and can move along its edges. An agent arriving at a node u, learns the label
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of the incoming port, the degree of u and the labels of the outgoing ports. We assume
there are k honest anonymous identical agents A1, A2, . . . Ak, and one malicious agent
M which may deviate from the proper operations. The initial locations of the honest
and malicious agents are decided by an adversary. We describe below the capabilities
and behaviour of honest and malicious agents.
Honest agents: An honest agent located at a node u can see all other agents at u (if
any), and can also read their states. It can also read the degree of u and the labels of
the outgoing ports. The agents are anonymous, cannot exchange messages and cannot
leave messages at nodes. They are identical finite state automata, hence they have some
constant memory. The agents do not know n and k. Two agents travelling on the same
edge in different directions do not notice each other, and cannot meet on the edge. Their
goal is to rendezvous at a node.
Malicious agent: We consider a worst case scenario in which the malicious agent M
is a very powerful entity compared to honest agents: It can move arbitrarily fast inside
the network (since the model is asynchronous and the adversary is combined with the
malicious agent) and it can permanently ‘see’ the positions of all the other agents. It
has unlimited memory and knows the transition function of the honest agents. When it
resides at a node u it prevents any honest agent A from visiting u (i.e., it “blocks” A):
if an agent A attempts to visit u it receives a signal that M is in u (botnet detection)
and in that case we say that A bumps into M . The malicious agent can neither visit a
node which is already occupied by some honest agent, nor cross some honest agent in
a link. It also obeys the FIFO property of the links (i.e., it cannot overpass an honest
agent which is moving on a link).
We call a node u occupied (respectively, free or unoccupied) when one or more
(no) honest agents are in u. We notice here that some of our impossibility results hold
even for stronger models, e.g., when honest agents have unlimited memory, distinct
identities, knowledge about the size of the network, visibility, etc. Our algorithm for the
ring topology only requires the capabilities of the honest agents mentioned above while
for the mesh topology we assume that the honest agents also have the ability to scan
whether a node within a two-hops distance, is occupied or not.
2.2 Basic Properties
In this section we show a special class of configurations for which the problem is un-
solvable. Intuitively, those are configurations in which the malicious agent can keep
separated at least two agents forever.
Definition 1. Let C be a configuration of a number of agents in a graph G with a
malicious agent. The configuration C is called separable if there is a connected vertex
cut-set F composed of free nodes which, when removed, disconnects G so that not all
occupied nodes are in the same connected component.
Lemma 1. Rendezvous is impossible for any initial configuration in a graphG which is
separable, even if the agents have unlimited memory, distinct identities and can always
see their current configuration.
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Proof. Let C be an initial configuration which is separable, and let F be a connected
vertex cut-set, whose removal disconnects G so that not all occupied nodes are in the
same connected component. Let u, v be two occupied nodes which are in different con-
nected components of G and let A,B be the honest agents located at u, v respectively.
Due to asynchronicity an adversary can introduce delays to A’s and B’s movements
while at the same time the malicious agent, which has been initially placed at a node
in F , can move everywhere in F (since F has only free nodes and it is connected)
preventing agents A,B, from visiting any node in F . Since all paths between u and v
include at least one node of F , agents A,B can never meet, no matter how powerful
they are. ⊓⊔
Hence for every initial separable configuration the problem is unsolvable. A natural
question is whether there are non-separable initial configurations for which the prob-
lem is unsolvable. The answer is yes and one can easily find such configurations (see
Examples 1 and 2 below).
We now state sufficient conditions under which the problem is unsolvable for a
separable (initial or not) configuration of agents.
Definition 2. Let Ct be a configuration at time t ≥ 0 (i.e., initial or not) of a number of
agents in a graph G with a malicious agent. The configuration Ct is called separating
if Ct is separable and either Ct is an initial configuration or the following conditions
hold:
– there is a node xm ∈ Ft (Ft is any vertex cut-set of Ct as defined in Definition 1)
and a path of nodes (x0, x1, . . . , xm) so that x0 is free at time 0 and,
– the sequence of nodes (x0, x1, . . . , xm) can be partitioned in k ≤ t+1 contiguous
subsequences (x00, . . . , x0i ), (x1i+1, . . . , x1j), . . . , (xkl+1, . . . , xkm), where 0 ≤ i <
j < l < m and,
– the nodes (xsw , . . . , xsr) belonging to the same subsequence s are free at time s,
where 0 ≤ s ≤ k and nodes (xkw, . . . , xkr ) are free at time t.
Lemma 2. Rendezvous is impossible for any separating configuration in a graph G,
even if the agents have unlimited memory, distinct identities and can always see their
current configuration.
PROOF Let Ct be a separating configuration of agents in a graph G with a malicious
agent. If Ct is an initial configuration then by Lemma 1, rendezvous is impossible.
Assume that Ct is a configuration that has resulted after some moves of the honest
agents. Since Ct is a separating configuration, the malicious agent can be initially placed
at x0 and at time 1 can move from the last node of subsequence 0 to the last node of
subsequence 1 via the path of free nodes at time 1. Then at time 2 it can move from
the last node of subsequence 1 to the last node of subsequence 2, and so on up to
time s when it can move to node xm where remains until time t. Since at time t, the
configuration Ct is separable and xm ∈ Ft, for the same arguments presented in the
proof of Lemma 1, there are at least two agents which will never meet. ⊓⊔
Intuitively, Lemma 2 states that if Ct is a separable configuration, and in Ct there is
a free node x so that either: i) x has been always free or, ii) there are paths of nodes
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which eventually become free and they form a connection between a free node at C0
and x, then there are at least two agents in Ct which will never meet. Hence, any correct
algorithm for the solution of the problem should avoid creating a separating configura-
tion.
Example 1. Suppose that the set of occupied nodes is connected and the configuration
is as shown in Fig. 1 left (the occupied nodes are denoted by circled nodes). Any cor-
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Fig. 1. Left: Hf and Ho are the subgraphs induced by all free and occupied nodes, respectively.
Let Q be a vertex cut-set of Ho consisting of the nodes x1, x2. The removal of nodes in Q splits
Ho into Ho1 and Ho2 . The malicious agent M resides at a and there is an edge {x1, a} ∈ E(G).
Right: Initially, nodes x, y are unreachable by the malicious agent M located at node m. If any
agent moves, then M can reach both nodes x, y and all new free nodes and therefore prevent the
agents on the left to meet the agents on the right.
rect algorithm for the rendezvous problem should avoid moving the agents from both
x1, x2 nodes as long as there are agents in Ho1 and Ho2 since in that case the resulting
configuration will be separating. In other words, in such a case the malicious agent will
prevent forever the meeting of any agent in Ho1 with an agent in Ho2 . However, due
to the asynchronicity of the agents’ movements and the limited knowledge the agents
have about the configuration, an algorithm cannot guarantee such a behaviour (even if
the agents have unlimited memory and distinct identities). ⊓⊔
Example 2. Consider now the initial configuration C in graph G of Fig. 1 right. There
are sets Fi of free nodes whose removal would disconnect G so that not all occupied
nodes are in the same connected component. However every such set Fi is discon-
nected. Hence the configuration is not separable. The agents are in the circled nodes of
Fig. 1 right, and the malicious agent is in node m. If any agent moves, then the new
subgraph of occupied nodes remains disconnected, but the new subgraph of free nodes
(whose removal disconnects G so that not all occupied nodes are in the same connected
component), becomes connected and thus the resulting configuration is separating. In
other words, if any agent moves then the malicious agent will prevent forever the meet-
ing of any two agents occupying nodes left and right of node x. Hence no matter how
much power or capabilities the agents have (even if they can see the configuration at all
times), rendezvous is impossible. ⊓⊔
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3 Rendezvous in a Ring Network
In this section we will study the rendezvous problem in bidirectional rings with a ma-
licious agent M . Notice that in a ring topology there are no separable (and hence no
separating either) configurations, since there cannot exist a connected cut-set composed
of free nodes whose removal would disconnect the ring. However, since the ring is
highly symmetric, rendezvous is impossible even if the agents have unlimited memory
and have full knowledge of the configuration, since an adversary can keep synchronized
the agents so that they always take the same actions at the same time and therefore they
maintain their initial distances (the malicious agent can keep on moving synchronized
with the honest agents). Thus, in order to solve the problem we need to add some con-
straints to the model. A natural step is to assume that there is a special node labeled
o∗ in the ring which can be recognized by the agents. Note that the malicious agent is
so powerful that it could place itself on o∗ and never move from there. Our strategies
also work under this scenario. We now present algorithms for solving the problem in
oriented and unoriented rings.
3.1 Oriented Ring
In an oriented ring, the two incident edges at each node are labelled as clockwise or
counter-clockwise in a consistent manner; so, all agents agree on the ring orientation.
The idea of the algorithm is the following. Each agent moves in the clockwise di-
rection until it meets o∗ or bumps into M . For the first three times that the agent bumps
into M without meeting o∗, it reverses its direction and continues moving in the op-
posite direction. Due to the FIFO property and the fact that the agent cannot pass over
M , we can show that if an agent bump into M after reversing directions at least three
times, then the other agents should have bumped into M at least twice, without meeting
the special node o∗ (see Lemma 3). After an agent has already bumped into M three
times, the next time it bumps into M or meets o∗ it stops. On the other hand, if the
agent meets o∗ before it bumps into M twice, then the agent stops at o∗, and all the
other agents will arrive at o∗ after bumping into M at most once. The algorithm called
RV-OR is presented below.
Lemma 3. During the execution of the algorithm, if an agent bumps into M in the
fourth iteration of the while loop, then any other agent must have bumped into M at
least two times.
PROOF Consider the first agent A that bumps into M two times at nodes u, v without
meeting o∗ and consider the segment of the ring between these two nodes u and v,
where A was moving until it bumped into M for the second time. The special node o∗
cannot be in this segment, otherwise the agent A would have stopped there. If another
agent B meets o∗ without having bumped into M (i.e., going clockwise), then it will
stop there, and when agent A or any other agent changes direction at the second bump,
it will reach the Stopped agent B, before bumping into M for a third time. So no agent
reaches the fourth iteration in this case. Now suppose that an agent C meets o∗ after
having bumped into M once (i.e. going counter-clockwise), then agent C stops at o∗.
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Algorithm 1: RV-OR : Rendezvous of k ≥ 2 agents in oriented rings
Let i := 0;
DIR := Clockwise;
while not Stopped do
Move DIR until you bump into M or meet o∗ or a stopped agent;
i=i+1;
if you met a Stopped agent then
Become Stopped and Exit loop;
if i = 1 or i = 2 then
if Current node is o∗ then
Become Stopped and Exit loop;
else if Bumped into M then
Reverse direction (DIR := inverse(DIR));
if i = 3 then
if Current node is o∗ or Bumped into M then
Reverse direction (DIR := inverse(DIR));
if i = 4 then
if Current node is o∗ or Bumped into M then
Become Stopped and Exit Loop ;
At this time, agent A must be in its third iteration (having bumped twice into M ). Agent
A will bump into M for the third time and reverse direction. Now agent A will reach
o∗ and the Stopped agent C before reaching M in its fourth iteration. So, if the agent A
bumps into M in its fourth iteration, this implies that no agent meets o∗ in the first two
iterations i.e. all other agents have bumped into M twice. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Algorithm RV-OR solves rendezvous of k ≥ 2 agents in spite of one mali-
cious agent, in any oriented ring containing one special node o∗.
PROOF
Case 1: No agent reaches the third iteration of the while loop. Thus no agent has bumped
into M more than once. In this case all agents will eventually reach o∗ and stop there.
So, rendezvous is achieved.
Case 2: No agent reaches the fourth iteration. Consider the first agent A to reach the
third iteration of the while loop. Then this agent has bumped into M twice (and it has
changed direction twice). If this agent meets a Stopped agent then the Stopped agent
must be in the special node o∗. In this case any subsequent agent would also reach o∗ by
the same argument and thus we have rendezvous. Thus, either rendezvous is achieved
or the agent A in the third iteration does not reach a Stopped agent and enters the fourth
iteration of the loop.
Case 3: If all agents that reach the fourth iteration, stop at o∗ or at another stopped
agent, then we have rendezvous at o∗ (since any agent that stops before the fourth
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iteration should have stopped at o∗). So the only remaining case is when an agent stops
on bumping into M in the fourth iteration.
In this case, due to Lemma 3 all other agents would have bumped into M at least
2 times, i.e they would all reach the third iteration of the loop. Since no agent in the
third iteration can stop at M or o∗ they either eventually reach their fourth iteration or
they meet an agent which has stopped in its fourth iteration. Let A be the first agent that
stops in its fourth iteration.
Subcase 3.1:We first consider the case that A stops at o∗. Let B be an agent that bumps
into M and stops at its fourth iteration (since we are in case 3). Note that agents A and
B have changed direction exactly 3 times before reaching the 4th iteration of the loop,
so the agents are moving in the same direction in the fourth iteration (even though they
may not reach the fourth iteration at the same time). Let without loss of generality, that
direction be counter-clockwise. Since agent B stops at M in its fourth iteration it could
not have bumped into M at the end of its third iteration because in that case it would
mean that the malicious agent has disconnected the area containing the honest agents
which is impossible. Hence, agent B must have met o∗ at the end of its third iteration,
before agent A stops there (otherwise B would stop at o∗). Consider the part of the ring
that starts with agent A and ends with agent B in counter-clockwise direction, when B
ends its third iteration at o∗. If the malicious agent lies in that part then B cannot bump
into M in its fourth iteration. If M does not lie in that part then A should have met o∗
at the end of its second iteration and hence A should have stopped then.
Subcase 3.2:We now consider the case that A stops at M . By the time A stops at M ,
agent B is at least in the third iteration. When this agent meets either M or o∗ in the
third iteration, it changes its direction and now there is neither M nor o∗ between this
agent and agent A. So agent B will meet agent A before B reaches M or o∗, thus, we
will have rendezvous. ⊓⊔
3.2 Unoriented Rings
In unoriented rings, each agent has its own notion of clockwise and the agents may not
agree on the clockwise direction. In this case rendezvous is not always feasible.
Lemma 5. For any even number k ≥ 2, the rendezvous problem for k honest agents
and one malicious agent cannot be solved in any bidirectional unoriented anonymous
ring with a special node o∗, even if the agents know k.
PROOF
Consider the following initial configuration fixed by an adversary: the honest agents
are initially placed in k consecutive nodes and the remaining nodes, including node o∗,
are unoccupied (see Fig. 2). Let m and m′ be the two extremities of the unoccupied seg-
ment of the ring; The malicious agent M is initially placed somewhere on this segment
and thus, it can move between nodes m,m′ preventing any honest agent from visiting
those nodes. The adversary splits the chain of consecutive initially occupied nodes into
two subchains of equal length and forces any two agents to have a different orienta-
tion of the ring if and only if they belong to different subchains. The configuration is
symmetric with an axis of symmetry crossing the chain of agents in the middle. Each
10
m’m
o*
M
Fig. 2. An even number of agents are initially placed in the lower part of the ring between m and
m′, and the malicious agent can move in the remaining upper part . The agents cannot rendezvous.
honest agent has a symmetric counterpart on the other side of the axis. Suppose there is
an algorithm A which solves rendezvous. Irrespective of the actions of the algorithm,
the adversary can synchronize the agents so that at any given time, any two symmetric
agents which initially belong to different subchains have the same input: They always
arrive at symmetric nodes through the same (perceived) direction, and symmetric nodes
are either unoccupied, occupied by the same number of agents, or adjacent to m and
m′ (i.e., the agents bump into M ). Hence the configuration remains symmetric at every
time step and any two symmetric agents belonging to different subchains will never
occupy the same node at the same time. ⊓⊔
We now present an algorithm for solving rendezvous of k agents, for any odd integer
k, in an unoriented asynchronous ring network. Notice that in an unoriented ring, if we
follow an algorithm similar to Algorithm RV-OR it is possible that the agents form
two distinct groups that gather at two distinct nodes. However, since the total number
of agents is odd, exactly one of the two groups would have even number of agents,
thus one of the agents of this group could move to collect all the other agents. The
algorithm must ensure that there are at most two groups of agents, i.e. there are at most
two distinct nodes where the agents stop in the initial phase. In our algorithm, an agent
stops at o∗ only if it has seen it at least three times, while moving in the same direction.
This implies that this agent has traversed the complete ring two times and while M
has moved at least once around the ring. So, there could be no agents moving in the
opposite direction. On the other hand if some agent stops while bumping into M , then
any agent moving in the same direction would reach this node with the stopped agent
before reaching M or o∗. In all cases, there will be at most two nodes where the agents
stop. When two or more agents have gathered at a node v, one of the agents called
the searcher1 reverses direction and moves to search for the other agents. The searcher
only stops when it reaches the other node w containing stopped agents. If the number of
agents gathered at node w is even then the searcher becomes a Collector and it collects
all agents and returns to node v. Note that the agent does not need to count the number
of other agents as the algorithm depends only on the parity of the size of the group of
agents. The complete algorithm, called RV-UR is presented in a following table.
1 We select as searcher the second agent that arrives at node v.
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Algorithm 2: RV-UR : Rendezvous in unoriented rings
Case 0. Initial state
Move clockwise until:
Case 0.1. You meet node o∗ unoccupied for the third time:
Change state to stopper;
Case 0.2. You bump into M trying to move from a node that hosts only you:
Change state to stopper;
Case 0.3. You meet an agent not at node o∗:
Case 0.3.1. The agent you meet is alone and is a stopper:
Change state to transformer-1;
Case 0.3.2. Every other agent at the node is at state final:
Change state to stopper;
Case 0.3.3. You meet a stopper and at least one agent at state final:
Change state to transformer-2;
Case 1. State transformer-1
Wait until all other agents change to state final;
Change state to searcher;
Case 2. State searcher
Move counter-clockwise until you bump into M while you try to move from a node u:
Case 2.1. You see one or more agents at u and all of them are at state final:
Change state to stopper;
Case 2.2. You see no agent at u or an agent not at state final:
Change state to collector;
Case 3. State stopper
Wait until:
Case 3.1. You see a transformer-1 or transformer-2: Change state to final;
Case 3.2. You see a collector: Follow collector;
Case 3.3. You see a terminator: Change state to terminator;
Case 4. State collector
Wait until every other agent at the node changes its state to stopper;
Collect everyone;
Move clockwise collecting every agent you meet, until you meet an agent at state final;
Change state to terminator;
Case 5. State final
Wait until:
Case 5.1. You see a collector: Change state to stopper;
Case 5.2. You see a terminator: Change state to terminator;
Case 6. State transformer-2
Wait until every other agent at the node changes its state to final;
Change state to final;
Case 7. State terminator
Wait until every other agent at the node changes its state to terminator;
Exit;
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Lemma 6. Consider an anonymous ring consisting of n nodes, including a special
node o∗ and one malicious agent. If k ≥ 2 honest agents execute Algorithm RV-UR,
then, after a total number of O(kn) edge traversals the honest agents correctly ren-
dezvous, if k is odd.
PROOF Case 1: All agents have the same orientation. Let A be the first agent which
W
A
B
M
o*
m
M
C
M
Case 1 a Case 2a Case 2b
Z W Z
Fig. 3. The cases of Lemma 6.
exits the initial state (either by meeting node o∗ for the third time, or by bumping into
M ).
– Suppose that A meets node o∗ (for the third time) and therefore A becomes a stop-
per (see Fig. 3.1a). Consider the next agent B which exits the initial state. Agent B
should bump into M . Let m be the node where B is located when it tries to move
and bumps into M . B becomes a stopper. Then let C be the next agent that exits the
initial state. Agent C should meet agent B (notice that if C passes from the special
node o∗ will not stop to meet agent A). Thus C passes from cases (0.3.1)→ (1)→
(2.2) → (4) → (7) of the Algorithm RV-RING, collecting agent A and ending at
node m. Meanwhile, all other agents (if any) gather at node m, since they pass from
cases (0.3.2) and then possibly (3.1), or (0.3.3) and (6), all of them ending at state
final except possibly one which is at state stopper. Hence, when agent C arrives at
m, all the agents change to state terminator and exit.
– Suppose that A bumps into M when it tries to move from a node m. Consider the
next agent B which exits the initial state. If B meets node o∗ then we can argue
similarly as in the previous paragraph by replacing agent A there with B. If B
meets A, then we can again argue as in the previous paragraph by replacing agents
B and C there with A and B respectively.
Case 2: Not all agents have the same orientation. We first observe that if there are at least
two agents X and Y having a different orientation for the ring, then no agent will exit
the initial state by stopping at the special node o∗. Indeed, let CX and CY be the subsets
of agents having the same orientation for the ring as agents X and Y , respectively. Due
to the presence of the malicious agent M in the ring (and the fact that M can not cross
an honest agent), an agent from CX (or CY ) can pass at most twice from the special
node o∗ and then it has to bump into M : a) Suppose that M is after an agent Z ∈ CX
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and before an agent W ∈ CY on the direction that Z is moving (see Fig. 3.2b). Then
Z may pass at most once from the special node o∗ before it bumps into M . b) Suppose
that M is before an agent Z ∈ CX and after an agent W ∈ CY on the direction that Z is
moving (see Fig. 3.2a). Then Z may pass at most twice from the special node o∗ before
it bumps into M .
Hence let A ∈ CX without loss of generality be the first agent which exits the
initial state and bumps into M when it tries to move from a node m, and let B (which
should belong to CY due to the FIFO links) be the first agent which exits the initial
state and bumps into M when it tries to move from a node m′. Both agents A and B
become stoppers. Then let C be the next agent that exits the initial state and meets
A or B. Suppose without loss of generality that C meets A (and therefore C ∈ CX ).
Hence C becomes a searcher and moves counter-clockwise. All other agents (if any)
belonging in CX will gather at node m. A similar situation may appear at node m′ if
there are more agents belonging in CY (i.e., having the same orientation for the ring
as agent B). Nevertheless there will be at most two searchers C,D and they will have
different orientation for the ring. All other agents will gather at nodes m and m′ before
the searchers D and C arrive at m and m′ respectively. If the total number k of the
honest agents is odd, then exactly one of the sets CX , CY has an odd number of agents.
Suppose without loss of generality that CX has an odd number of agents. Then at node
m exactly one of the agents there, it will be at state stopper while at node m′ there will
be only agents at state final, before the corresponding searcher arrives at each node.
Hence only the searcher which reaches m will change its state to collector, will collect
all agents and gather with everyone at node m′ (the other searcher which arrives at m′
will stay there).
In any case above, it is easy to see that each agent may traverse the network at most
a constant number of times before rendezvous occurs. Hence, the total number of edge
traversals (i.e., steps) for all the agents is O(kn). ⊓⊔
The following result summarizes the results of this section:
Theorem 1. In any anonymous and asynchronous ring with a special node o∗ and one
malicious agent, k honest agents having constant memory and no knowledge about their
number, can solve the rendezvous problem if and only if either the ring is oriented or k
is odd.
We briefly consider the case when there could be multiple malicious agents in the
network. In this case, rendezvous is feasible only if all the malicious agents are located
in a continuous segment of the ring with no honest agent in between. This scenario is
equivalent to the one with a single malicious agent and thus the same algorithm would
work in this case.
4 Rendezvous in an Oriented Mesh Network
We now study the problem in an oriented mesh network. In view of Lemma 1, ren-
dezvous is impossible for separable initial configurations. Hence, in this section we
study the problem for a special class of non separable initial configurations and we give
an algorithm that solves the problem for this type of configurations. In particular, we
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focus on initial configurations where the induced subgraph of the occupied nodes is
connected without holes, i.e., there is no connected set of unoccupied nodes surrounded
by occupied nodes. At the end of the section we discuss the solvability of the problem
in other classes of initial non separable configurations.
First observe that even in configurations that consist of a simple path of occupied
nodes, the problem is unsolvable in the considered model due to network asynchronic-
ity: Initially all agents have the same input and thus (following any potentially correct
algorithm), they should all try to move; however, an adversary may slowdown all agents,
except for one not located at the endpoints of the path, hence creating a separating con-
figuration. Thus, by Lemma 2 the problem is unsolvable.
Therefore, the agents need to be able to gain some knowledge about their current
configuration before they move in order to avoid creating a separating configuration. We
enhance our model by giving the agents, the capability to discover all occupied nodes
within a distance of d-hops.
Definition 3. We say that an agent A located at a node x can see (or scan) at a distance
d or it has d-visibility if A can decide for any node u within a distance of d hops from
x, whether u is occupied or not by an honest agent.
We emphasize that, if a node u scanned by agent A is occupied, A cannot tell how
many agents are in u, or read their states. When the agents have a d−visibility capability
we assume that moves are instantaneous, i.e., an agent cannot be traveling along an edge
while another agent is scanning its neighbourhood. Unfortunately, as we show below,
even when the agents have 1−visibility (i.e., they can only scan their neighbours), the
problem remains unsolvable for some connected without holes configurations.
Lemma 7. The rendezvous problem is unsolvable in an oriented mesh with a malicious
agent for initial connected without holes configurations, even when the agents are ca-
pable of scanning their adjacent nodes.
PROOF Consider any algorithm that moves an agent A having exactly two adjacent
occupied nodes according to its local view as shown in any of the four configurations
of Figure 4 right. Notice that if the algorithm also moves agents having exactly one
adjacent occupied node in any of those configurations, then an adversary may execute
A’s move and delay any other agents’ moves. Then clearly any such algorithm cannot
be correct since after A’s move in any configuration of Figure 4 right, the configura-
tion becomes separating and by Lemma 2 the problem is unsolvable. Therefore any
potentially correct algorithm should not move agents with exactly two adjacent occu-
pied nodes and local view any of those shown in Figure 4 right. However, in a similar
new configuration where there is a fourth agent occupying the empty node adjacent to
two occupied nodes in any configuration of Figure 4 right, no agent can move (since
any agent cannot differentiate this new configuration from one of the configurations in
Figure 4 right). Hence the agents in such a configuration cannot meet. ⊓⊔
Additionally, as Figure 4 left demonstrates, an agent either having: 1) exactly two
adjacent occupied nodes on their West and East or, 2) exactly two adjacent occupied
nodes on their South and North or, 3) three adjacent occupied nodes, cannot move since
the resulting configuration will be separating. Therefore, for any algorithm that moves
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Fig. 4. Left: Every occupied node is adjacent to at least two other occupied nodes. Right: A
gamma configuration and its three rotations.
an agent adjacent to two or three occupied nodes there are infinitely many configura-
tions for which this algorithm fails to gather the agents (i.e., configurations where every
occupied node is either adjacent to two or to three occupied nodes).
Hence we further equip the agents with the capability of discovering the occupied
nodes within a two-hops distance. In that case, as we show below, the problem can be
solved for any connected without holes initial configuration.
We present an algorithm which instructs the agents to move only to occupied nodes
in a way that they maintain the connectivity and they do not create holes. In order to
describe the algorithm we define eleven local configurations as shown in Fig. 5. In these
configurations, empty circles represent free nodes, while circles containing black dots
represent occupied nodes. The remaining vertices on the figures represent nodes which
may be either occupied or free. The agent (let us call it A) which is located below a
horizontal arrow in cases (a-g), moves horizontally as depicted by the arrow. The agent
(let us call it B) which is located left of a vertical arrow in cases (h-m), moves vertically
as depicted by the arrow. Hence the algorithm can be described as follows:
Algorithm RV-MESH: If an agent has a view (within two hops) like the one of agent
A or B described before, then this agent moves towards the direction shown by the
corresponding arrow; otherwise the agent does not move.
Nodes which are within two hops from the scanning agent and are not shown in
those configurations can be either occupied or free. If the location of the scanning agent
is close to the border of the mesh and some of the nodes in those eleven configurations
do not exist, then the agent acts as it would act if those nodes existed in its view and
were free. Moreover, while an agent A located at a node u is executing its scan or
compute phase then no other operation can take place at u before A moves or decides
to stay (i.e., no other agent at u can start scanning and no other agent can arrive at u).
That is, operations at a node u are executed in mutual exclusion. Notice that if two
adjacent agents want to swap positions they can only do it at the same time. We now
present three lemmas.
Lemma 8. Given an n × m oriented mesh, for any connected configuration without
holes of at least three occupied nodes, there is at least one agent whose view is in one
of the configurations depicted in Fig. 5.
PROOF Select the column with at least one occupied node which is closer to the left
(West) border of the mesh. From that column select the upper (North-West) occupied
node u. Hence the two nodes West and North of u are free. Since the configuration is
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Fig. 5. View of the scanning agent located below (cases a-g) or left (cases h-m) of the depicted
arrow. Occupied nodes are depicted as cycles containing black dots, while free nodes are depicted
as empty cycles. Nodes which are within two hops from the scanning agent but not shown, can
be either occupied or free. The scanning agent will move East in cases (a, b), West in cases
(c, d, e, f, g), South in case (h), and North in cases (i, l, m).
connected, at least one of the nodes East (say w) or South (say v) of u, is occupied. If
only w is occupied then the agents at u have the view of Fig. 5 (a) and move towards
East. If only v is occupied then the agents at u have the view of Fig. 5 (h) and move
towards South. If both w, v are occupied then if the node which is East of v and South
of w (say z) is occupied, the agents at u have the view of Fig. 5 (b) and move towards
East. If however, node z is free, then the agents at u do not move. In this last case, since
the configuration is connected and without holes, and thus cycles, it is composed of the
following two ‘generalised’ trees: One tree starts with edge (u, v) and the other starts
with edge (u,w). Each occupied node of the configuration different from u, appears
in exactly one of those two trees (otherwise there would be a cycle of occupied nodes
containing node z). We call these trees ‘generalised’ because some parts of the trees
could be ‘thick’ (i.e., composed of more than one row or column of occupied nodes).
Notice that there should be a frontier of free nodes which extends from node z to ei-
ther the East or the South border of the mesh, which prevents any two occupied nodes
belonging to different trees, from being connected through any path of occupied nodes
that is not passing from node u (since if such a path exists for two nodes, then the free
node z would be contained in a cycle of occupied nodes). We can now show that at
least one agent on some branch of a tree will move according to one of the views of
Fig. 5. In fact we prove that the branches of the tree (which extend East, West, North
or South) shrink starting from their ends. First it is easy to see that for occupied nodes
which are connected only to their East or to their South, the agents there, have views
of Fig. 5 (a) and (h) respectively, and they will move accordingly. For occupied nodes
which are connected only to their West or to their North, the agents there, have views
of Fig. 5 (e,f,g) and (i,l,m) respectively, and they will move accordingly. For branches
with blocks of at least 4 occupied nodes:
1. If the branch extends to the West then its upper leftmost occupied node x is con-
nected only to its East and South, the agents at x have the view of Fig. 5 (b) and
they move towards East. After repeating such moves and some others based on the
view of Fig. 5 (a), the branch will be eliminated.
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2. If the branch extends to the North then its upper leftmost occupied node x is con-
nected only to its East and South, the agents at x have the view of Fig. 5 (b) and
they move towards East. After repeating such moves and some others based on the
view of Fig. 5 (h) and maybe some moves based on the views of Fig. 5 (c,d), the
branch will be eliminated.
3. If the branch extends to the East then its upper rightmost occupied node y is con-
nected only to its West and South, the agents at y have the view of Fig. 5 (c,d) and
they move towards West. After repeating such moves and some others based on the
view of Fig. 5 (e,f,g), the branch will be eliminated.
4. If the branch extends to the South then:
– if its upper leftmost occupied node x is connected only to its East and South or
its upper rightmost occupied node y is connected only to its West and South,
the agents at x or y can repeatedly move based on the views of Fig. 5 (b,a,i,l),
or (c,d,e,f,g) respectively, and the branch will be eliminated.
– if both its upper leftmost occupied node x is connected to its West or North and
its upper rightmost occupied node y is connected to its East and North then in
at least one of those nodes x, y those extra branches can be eliminated as above
so that case 3 above will hold.
⊓⊔
Lemma 9. Given an n × m oriented mesh, consider a connected configuration of k
agents in two occupied nodes. According to Algorithm RV-MESH, after a total number
of at most k + 1 edge traversals there will be only one occupied node.
PROOF If the occupied nodes are in a row, then it may happen that two agents move
based on views (not perceived from the same present configuration) of Fig. 5 (a and e),
swapping places. However, then only the agents on the West will move according to
view of the Fig. 5 (a), and they all gather at one node.
If the occupied nodes are in a column, then it may happen that two agents move
based on views (not perceived from the same configuration) of Fig. 5 (h and i), swapping
places. However, then only the agents on the North will move according to view of the
Fig. 5 (h), and they all gather at one node. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Given an n × m oriented mesh, consider any connected configuration
without holes of k agents occupying at least 3 nodes. After any number of moves ac-
cording to Algorithm RV-MESH, the resulting configuration is also connected without
holes. Furthermore, the number of occupied nodes will strictly decrease after at most k
edge traversals, reaching the value of only one occupied node after at most O(k2) edge
traversals.
PROOF Let C be any connected configuration without holes of k agents occupying
at least three nodes and let C′ be a resulting configuration after any number of agents’
moves according to Algorithm RV-MESH. First observe that since any agent can only
move to an adjacent node which was occupied at the moment the agent scanned, this
means that no agent will ever move to a node which was not occupied at C. Hence
C′ consists of a subset of occupied nodes of C, and since an agent which has all its
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neighbours occupied never moves, if C′ contains holes then it would mean that C also
contained holes, which is a contradiction.
Now we show that the new configuration C′ remains connected. Notice that an agent
A moves towards North or South only when it is adjacent to only one other occupied
node v and moves towards v (see cases (h,i,l,m) of Fig. 5). Furthermore, the agents at
node v cannot move according to any view before A moves. Hence if A moves towards
North or South it cannot disconnect the configuration. If an agent A moves towards
West (according to cases (e,f,g) of Fig. 5) or East (according to case (a) of Fig. 5)
then again it cannot disconnect the configuration since A has to move towards its only
neighbouring occupied node and agents from that node cannot move according to any
view before A moves. For the remaining cases ((b,c,d) of Fig. 5) we have: i) When an
agent A occupies the upper leftmost position of a block of at least 4 nodes (as shown in
case (b)) it moves towards East and only the upper rightmost agent B of the block could
be willing to move at the same time towards West based on an earlier view (according
to cases (c,d)). Then A,B can move at the same time. It is easy to see that the lower
two agents of the block cannot move by any view. ii) Similarly if an agent occupies the
upper rightmost position of a block of at least 4 nodes (as shown in cases (c,d)) it moves
towards West and only the upper leftmost agent of the block could be willing to move
at the same time towards East based on an earlier view (according to case (a)). Hence
the configuration remains connected.
Finally, we show that a configuration C′ that has resulted from C after at most k
edge traversals has strictly less occupied nodes than C. As proved before, either all co-
located agents will move (one by one) according to one of the views of Fig. 5 making
a new free node which will never be reoccupied or at a block of at least 4 occupied
nodes the top agents will swap positions. However, according to the views of Fig. 5,
this swapping may happen only once for a fixed block (since the views change). Hence
after a total number of at most (k − 1)/2 swaps and one additional move the occupied
nodes in C′ will be strictly less than in C. Thus after at most O(k2) edge traversals the
agents will rendezvous. ⊓⊔
In view of Lemmas 7, 8, 9, 10 we have:
Theorem 2. The rendezvous problem for k ≥ 2 agents can be solved for any initial
connected without holes configuration of agents in an n×m oriented mesh if and only
if the agents are able to discover the occupied nodes within a distance of two-hops.
If the initial non separable configuration is different from the one considered above,
then even the 2-visibility capability is not sufficient anymore to solve rendezvous. In
fact Fig. 6, demonstrates that the problem remains unsolvable for connected configura-
tions with holes even when the agents are able to discover the occupied nodes within any
constant distance. The problem is also unsolvable for some disconnected non separable
configurations (see Fig. 7). Hence it appears that for many initial non separable con-
figurations in an oriented mesh, the combination of the asynchronicity and the limited
view (to any constant fraction of the complete view) makes the problem unsolvable.
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Fig. 6. An initially connected configuration of agents with a hole. Even if the agents are able
to discover the occupied nodes within any constant distance, this ‘polygonal’ configuration can
always be expanded so that all agents with the same number have exactly the same view and
therefore at least two of them should move. However, after those moves the resulting configura-
tion is separating and the problem is unsolvable.
M
Fig. 7. A disconnected non separable initial configuration of agents. The malicious agent has
been placed as depicted. If any agent moves then the resulting configuration is separating and the
problem is unsolvable.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied deterministic protocols for the rendezvous of k ≥ 2 honest
agents in asynchronous networks with a malicious agent which can prevent the agents
from reaching any node it occupies. We have presented algorithms for oriented and
unoriented ring networks which gathers the honest agents within O(kn) edge traversals
for all feasible instances of the problem. We have also presented a deterministic protocol
for oriented n × m meshes which leads the agents to rendezvous within O(k2) edge
traversals for any initial connected without holes configuration if and only if the agents
can discover the occupied nodes within a distance of two-hops. Given the novelty of
the model there are many interesting open questions. The first is whether the problem
can be solved in unoriented meshes for connected configurations without holes when
the agents are capable of scanning within a constant distance (more than one). It would
be also interesting to study randomized protocols for some of the unsolvable cases, and
also to study this problem in synchronous networks with unit-speed cooperating agents
and unit-speed/infinite-speed malicious agents. Finally, it would be interesting to study
the problem in (m + 1)-connected graphs in the presence of m malicious agents, or in
the solved cases presented in this paper in the presence of malicious agents that show a
more severe behaviour.
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